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I. INTRODUCTION 
Society’s transition away from the 20th Century Industrial Era is 
largely represented by the mass digitization of our daily lives.  As we 
modernize, so too has our method of consumption.  Today, equipped 
only with a smartphone, modern consumers can access a wide variety of 
goods and services.  With the click of a button, consumers can catch a 
ride home using Uber,1 Turo,2 or Lyft;3 book a swanky loft in Brazil 
using Airbnb4 or VRBO;5 rent designer clothes from Rent the Runway;6 
or have dry-cleaning picked up with TaskRabbit.7 
These services all form part of the larger “sharing economy.”  
Heralded as one of the “10 Ideas That Will Change the World,”8 the 
sharing economy comprises one of the fastest growing markets in the 
United States.9  In fact, approximately one quarter of the population in 
the United States, United Kingdom, and Canada engages in some form of 
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 1.   See UBER, https://www.uber.com/?exp=home_signup_form (last visited Sept. 25, 2016). 
 2.   See TURO, https://turo.com (last visited Sept. 25, 2016). 
 3.   See LYFT, https://www.lyft.com (last visited Sept. 25, 2016). 
 4.   See AIRBNB, https://www.airbnb.com (last visited Sept. 25, 2016). 
 5.   See VRBO, https://www.VRBO.com (last visited Sept. 25, 2016). 
 6.   RENT THE RUNWAY, https://www.renttherunway.com (last visited Sept. 25, 2016). 
 7.   See TASKRABBIT, https://www.taskrabbit.com (last visited Sept. 25, 2016). 
 8.   Rachel Botsman, The Sharing Economy Lacks a Shared Definition, FAST COMPANY (Nov. 
21, 2013, 7:30 AM) https://www.fastcoexist.com/3022028/the-sharing-economy-lacks-a-shared-
definition#8 (citing Bryan Walsh, 10 Ideas That Will Change the World: Today’s Smart Choice: 
Don’t Own. Share, TIME (Mar. 17, 2011), 
http://content.time.com/time/specials/packages/article/0,28804,2059521_2059717,00.html). 
 9.   Stephen Ufford, The Future of the Sharing Economy Depends on Trust, FORBES (Feb. 10, 
2015, 9:00 AM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/theyec/2015/02/10/the-future-of-the-sharing-
economy-depends-on-trust/. 
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the sharing economy.10  Unfortunately, current labor and employment 
laws do not adequately account for the new types of employment 
relationships formed within the fast-growing sharing economy. 
Online marketplaces where technological platforms facilitate peer-
to-peer transactions create a lot of legal uncertainty in the employment 
law context.  Workers who engage in these markets form employment 
relationships that take on characteristics of both entrepreneurialism and 
the employer-employee relationship.  The United States Supreme Court 
has long noted the potential for conflict with ambiguous employment 
relationships.  In NLRB v. Hearst Publications, Inc., the Court wrote, 
“Few problems in the law have given greater variety of application and 
conflict in results than the cases arising in the borderland between what 
is clearly an employer-employee relationship and what is clearly one of 
independent entrepreneurial dealing.”11  Whether by coincidence or 
foresight, the majority in Hearst aptly diagnosed one of the largest 
problems facing American labor and employment law today: the 
classification of sharing economy workers who exist in the borderland 
between employees and independent contractors.  Thus, the time has 
come to modernize outdated employment classifications and reimagine 
our traditional notions of employment relationships to encompass the 
new, rapidly growing workforce within the sharing economy. 
This Comment will confront the legal ambiguity that arises when the 
Fair Labor Standards Act (“FLSA”) is applied to the employment 
relationships created within the sharing economy.  This Comment also 
proposes a legislative solution to bring the FLSA into the modern era of 
employment law.  Part II.A of this Comment will examine the creation of 
the FLSA and its application to traditional employment relationships.  
Part II.B will address collaborative consumption and the rise of the 
sharing economy.  This section will also explore the peer-to-peer 
business model through a case study of Uber.  Part III.A addresses the 
vast policy implications of classifying sharing economy workers as 
traditional employees under the FSLA.  Part III.B proposes two possible 
legislative solutions that would modernize the FLSA employment 
classifications through the addition of a “dependent contractor” 
employment classification, or alternatively, the addition of a peer-to-peer 
                                                          
 10.   Id. (citing Jeremiah Owyang, Sharing is the New Buying: How to Win in the Collaborative 
Economy, SLIDESHARE 15 (Mar. 2, 2014), 
http://www.slideshare.net/jeremiah_owyang/sharingnewbuying). 
 11.   322 U.S. 111, 121 (1944), overruled in part by Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co. v. Darden, 503 
U.S. 318, 324 (1992). 
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market exemption. 
II. BACKGROUND 
Before addressing the proposed methods for classifying sharing 
economy workers it is important to understand the current climate of 
employment classifications under the Fair Labor Standards Act (“FLSA” 
or “Act”).  This Act governs the wage and hour requirements for public 
or private workers classified as “employees” under the Act’s definition.12  
No clear precedent has been established for the treatment of sharing 
economy workers under the FLSA.  In fact, one judge referred to this 
classification debacle as a situation in which the jury will be given “a 
square peg and asked to choose between two round holes.”13  This 
section will discuss the history of the FLSA, the classification of 
employment relationships under the FLSA, and the rise of collaborative 
consumption through the sharing economy. 
A. The Creation and Application of the FLSA 
The history of the American worker is wrought with tales of abuse 
and oppression.14  From slave labor to the exploitation of women, 
children, and people of color, early-American employers were rarely 
held accountable for the gross mistreatment of their workforce.15  In an 
attempt to remedy this misconduct, Congress created the Department of 
Labor with the purpose of “foster[ing], promot[ing], and develop[ing] the 
welfare of the wage earners of the United States.”16  This department was 
also charged with improving the working conditions of these wage 
earners and “advanc[ing] their opportunities for profitable 
employment.”17  To ensure compliance, Congress empowered the 
Secretary of Labor to: (1) “bring an action by or on behalf of any 
employee;”18 (2) impose civil penalties;19 and (3) seek injunctive relief 
                                                          
 12.   29 U.S.C. §§ 201–219 (2012 & Supp. II 2014); see also Wage & Hour Div., Fair Labor 
Standards Act, U.S. DEP’T OF LABOR, https://www.dol.gov/whd/flsa/ (last visited Sept. 20, 2016). 
 13.   Cotter v. Lyft, Inc., 60 F. Supp. 3d 1067, 1081 (N.D. Cal. 2015). 
 14.   See Edward Pessen, Chapter 2 Builders of the Young Republic, U.S. DEP’T OF LABOR, 
http://www.dol.gov/dol/aboutdol/history/chapter2.htm (last visited Sept. 20, 2016). 
 15.   See id. 
 16.   29 U.S.C. § 551 (2012). 
 17.   Id. 
 18.   29 U.S.C. § 216(c) (2012). 
 19.   § 216(e)(1)(A)–(e)(2). 
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against unpaid wages due to the employee.20  The Department of Labor’s 
Wage and Hour Division was established to further combat these abusive 
labor practices and to handle the administration and enforcement of 
various employment laws covering nearly “all private, [] [s]tate, and 
local government employment.”21  More specifically, the Wage and Hour 
Division’s mission is to “promote and achieve compliance with labor 
standards to protect and enhance the welfare of the Nation’s 
workforce.”22 
The Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938 was signed into law at the tail 
end of the Great Depression. This Act imposed new laws to eliminate 
some of the grueling labor conditions suffered by American workers.23  
Moreover, the purpose of the FLSA was to: 
[R]aise substandard wages and to give additional compensation for 
overtime work as to those employees within its ambit, thereby helping 
to protect this nation “from the evils and dangers resulting from wages 
too low to buy the bare necessities of life and from long hours of work 
injurious to health.”24 
Today, in keeping with legislative intent, the FLSA “establishes 
minimum wage, overtime pay, recordkeeping, and child labor standards 
affecting full-time and part-time workers in the private sector and 
federal, state, and local governments.”25 
In part, the FLSA defines the scope of employment relationships.26  
However, the Act only protects workers who can be classified as an 
“employee” under the broad FLSA definition.27  The FLSA defines the 
term “employee” as “any individual employed by an employer.”28  An 
“employer” is defined as “any person acting directly or indirectly in the 
                                                          
 20.   29 U.S.C. § 217 (2012). 
 21.   Wage and Hour Division History, U.S. DEP’T OF LABOR, 
https://www.dol.gov/whd/about/history/whdhist.htm (last visited Sept. 20, 2016). 
 22.   Wage and Hour Division Mission Statement, U.S. DEP’T OF LABOR, 
https://www.dol.gov/whd/about/mission/whdmiss.htm (last visited Sept. 20, 2016). 
 23.   See 29 U.S.C. § 202 (2012). 
 24.   United States v. Rosenwasser, 323 U.S. 360, 361 (1945) (citing S. REP. NO. 75-884, at 4 
(1937)). 
 25.   U.S. DEP’T OF LABOR, WAGE & HOUR DIV., HANDY REFERENCE GUIDE TO THE FAIR 
LABOR STANDARDS ACT (Nov. 2014), https://www.dol.gov/whd/regs/compliance/wh1282.pdf. 
 26.   See id. at 2. 
 27.   See U.S. Dep’t of Labor, Wage & Hour Div., Administrator’s Interpretation No. 2015-1, at 
3 (July 15, 2015), https://www.dol.gov/whd/workers/Misclassification/AI-2015_1.pdf [hereinafter 
Administrator’s Interpretation]. 
 28.   29 U.S.C. § 203(e)(1) (2012). 
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interest of an employer in relation to an employee.”29  The term 
“employ” or “to suffer or permit to work”30 was purposely drafted to 
create the broadest coverage possible.31  In practice, “[t]he Supreme 
Court ‘has consistently construed the Act “liberally to apply to the 
furthest reaches consistent with congressional direction,” recognizing 
that broad coverage is essential to accomplish the [Act’s] goal.’”32 
1. Defining the Employment Relationship 
The FLSA definitions of employ, employee, and employer are 
important for two reasons.  First, these definitions determine the scope of 
the employment relationship under the Act.33  Second, these definitions 
“provide the basis for distinguishing between employees and 
independent contractors.”34  Independent contractors are often described 
as economically independent workers “who are operating a business on 
their own.”35  Under the FLSA, any worker who is “economically 
dependent on the employer, regardless of skill level” is deemed an 
employee.36  However, because the FLSA defines “employ” so broadly, 
most workers are deemed employees under the Act.37 
Employers may not escape the broad application of the FLSA “suffer 
or permit to work” standard by contract because “[e]conomic realities, 
not contractual labels, determine employment status for the remedial 
purposes of the FLSA.”38  It is also important to note that workers 
classified as employees may not waive their classification status, or the 
rights conferred by that status, under the FLSA.39  This is true even when 
                                                          
 29.   § 203(d). 
 30.   § 203(g). 
 31.   See United States v. Rossenwasser, 323 U.S. 360, 362–63, 363 n.3 (1945); Nationwide 
Mut. Ins. Co. v. Darden, 503 U.S. 318, 326 (1992). 
 32.   Administrator’s Interpretation, supra note 27, at 3 (quoting Tony & Susan Alamo Found. 
v. Sec’y of Labor, 471 U.S. 290, 296 (1985)). 
 33.   Id. 
 34.   Id. 
 35.   Id. at 4. 
 36.   Id. 
 37.   Id. at 2. 
 38.   Real v. Driscoll Strawberry Assocs., Inc., 603 F.2d 748, 755 (9th Cir. 1979).  See also 
Rutherford Food Corp. v. McComb, 331 U.S. 722, 729 (1947) (“Where the work done, in its 
essence, follows the usual path of an employee, putting on an ‘independent contractor’ label does not 
take the worker from the protection of the Act.”); Usery v. Pilgrim Equip. Co., 527 F.2d 1308, 1315 
(5th Cir. 1976) (holding that “[n]either contractual recitations nor subjective intent can mandate the 
outcome in these cases.  Broader economic realities are determinative.”). 
 39.   Brooklyn Sav. Bank v. O’Neil, 324 U.S. 697, 708 (1945). 
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a worker desires to be classified as an independent contractor.40 
2. The Evolution of Employment Classification Tests 
Throughout the evolution of federal employment law, courts have 
relied on two general tests to determine whether a worker is an employee 
or an independent contractor: [1] the common law control test, and [2] 
the economic realities test.  The adoption of the modern economic 
realities test is indicative of the FLSA’s desire to capture more workers 
in their definition of an employee.41 
a. The Common Law Control Test 
Prior to the creation of the FLSA, courts primarily applied the 
common law “control test” to determine if an employment relationship 
existed.42  The control test was derived from the general common law of 
agency.43  When using this test, courts were only required to consider the 
level of control that was exerted by the employer over the employee.44  
More specifically, the control test looked at “whether or not the 
‘employer’ retains the right to control the manner and means by which 
the result is to be accomplished.”45 
Various iterations of the common law control test are still being used 
today.  Governmental agencies like the IRS and the National Labor 
Relations Board, for example, still use similar variations of the common 
law test.  Yet, despite its popularity, Congress declined to extend the 
common law control test in the FLSA.46  Instead, Congress focused on 
                                                          
 40.   Brennan v. Partida, 492 F.2d 707, 709 (5th Cir. 1974) (establishing that a worker may still 
be classified as an employee under the FLSA when “the parties had no intention of creating an 
employment relationship . . . [because] the FLSA does not turn on subjective intent”). 
 41.   See United States v. Rossenwasser, 323 U.S. 360, 362–63 (1945) (stating that “[a] broader 
or more comprehensive coverage of employees . . . would be difficult to frame.”). 
 42.   Administrator’s Interpretation, supra note 27, at 3. 
 43.   See NLRB v. United Ins. Co. of Am., 390 U.S. 254, 256 (1968); Cmty. for Creative Non-
Violence v. Reid, 490 U.S. 730, 751 (1989); Jeffrey E. Dilger, Pay No Attention to the Man Behind 
the Curtain: Control as a Nonfactor in Employment Status Determinations Under FedEx Home 
Delivery v. NLRB, 26 A.B.A. J. LAB. & EMP. L. 123, 123–24 (2010) (citing FedEx Home Delivery v. 
NLRB, 563 F.3d 492, 495 (D.C. Cir. 2009)). 
 44.   Dilger, supra note 43, at 126. 
 45.   Clayton Halunen, Summary of Tests Used for Determining Worker Status (2010) 
(emphasis added), 
http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/administrative/labor_law/meetings/2010/annualconfer
ence/021.authcheckdam.pdf (presented at the American Bar Association’s Fourth Annual Section of 
Labor and Employment Law Conference). 
 46.   See Walling v. Portland Terminal Co., 330 U.S. 148, 150–51 (1947). 
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the “broader economic realities of the working relationship.”47 
b. The Economic Realities Test 
When determining whether an employment relationship has been 
formed under the FLSA, courts now look to the broad economic realities 
of the employment relationship.48  Created by federal courts, this 
economic realities test questions “whether the worker is economically 
dependent on the employer or in business for him or herself.”49  This 
multi-factorial test requires the court to consider: [1] “the extent to which 
the work performed is an integral part of the employer’s business;” [2] 
“the worker’s opportunity for profit or loss depending on his or her 
managerial skill;” [3] “the extent of the relative investments of the 
employer and the worker;” [4] “whether the work performed requires 
special skills and initiative;” [5] “the permanency of the relationship;” 
and [6] “the degree of control exercised or retained by the employer.”50 
While not exhaustive, these factors should be “liberally construed to 
provide broad coverage for workers.”51  Because no single factor may be 
used to establish existence of an employer-employee relationship under 
the economic realities test,52 the control element must not be considered 
determinative.53  Similarly, an employment classification determined 
under the common law control test must not be considered determinative 
under the FLSA.54  The Supreme Court in Walling v. Portland Terminal 
Co. explained: 
[I]n determining who are “employees” under the Act, common law 
employee categories or employer-employee classifications under other 
statutes are not of controlling significance.  This Act contains its own 
definitions, comprehensive enough to require its application to many 
persons and working relationships, which prior to this Act, were not 
deemed to fall within an employer-employee category.55 
                                                          
 47.   Administrator’s Interpretation, supra note 27, at 3. 
 48.   See, e.g., Tony & Susan Alamo Found. v. Sec’y of Labor, 471 U.S. 290, 301 (1985); Usery 
v. Pilgrim Equip. Co., 527 F.2d 1308, 1315 (5th Cir. 1976); see also Goldberg v. Whitaker House 
Coop., Inc., 366 U.S. 28, 33 (1961). 
 49.   Administrator’s Interpretation, supra note 27, at 2. 
 50.   Id. at 4. 
 51.   Id. 
 52.   Id. at 2, 4. 
 53.   Id. at 2. 
 54.   Walling v. Portland Terminal Co., 330 U.S. 148, 150 (1947). 
 55.   Id. at 150–51 (citations omitted) (first citing NLRB v. Hearst Publ’ns, Inc., 322 U.S. 111, 
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Furthermore, “the factors themselves should not be applied in a 
mechanical fashion.”56  Because these factors are to be viewed as 
“indicators of the broader concept of economic dependence,”57 courts 
should consider each factor as it relates to the others and avoid applying 
the factors as a checklist.58 
i. The Department of Labor Administrator’s Interpretation 
Given the growing number of employees misclassified as 
independent contractors, the Department of Labor Wage and Hour 
Division published an Administrator’s Interpretation (“Interpretation”) 
regarding the identification of misclassified employees.59  This 
Interpretation offers guidance on the correct application of the FLSA’s 
economic realities test when determining whether to classify a worker as 
an employee or an independent contractor.60 
The clear emphasis of this Interpretation is the broad application of 
the FLSA “suffer or permit” standard.61  Generally speaking, under this 
interpretation an employee is someone who is “economically dependent 
on the employer,” while an independent contractor is “in business for 
him or herself.”62  The Interpretation also explained the correct 
application of each economic realities factor.63  These explanations will 
be discussed in reference to a case study later on in this article.64 
B. The Rise of Collaborative Consumption 
As society transitioned away from the passive consumerism of the 
20th Century “Industrial Economy,” it has moved towards a 
“Collaborative Economy” fueled by innovation, efficiency, and trust.65  
The term, “Collaborative Consumption,” refers to “[t]he reinvention of 
                                                          
128–29 (1944), overruled in part by Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co. v. Darden, 503 U.S. 318, 324 (1992); 
then citing United States v. Rosenwasser, 323 U.S. 360, 362–63 (1945)). 
 56.   Administrator’s Interpretation, supra note 27, at 2. 
 57.   Id. 
 58.   Id. at 4. 
 59.   Id. at 1. 
 60.   See id. 
 61.   See id. at 2–4. 
 62.   Id. at 2. 
 63.   See id. at 2–15. 
 64.   See infra Section II.B.1.a. 
 65.   See Rachel Botsman, The Sharing Economy Lacks a Shared Definition, FAST COMPANY 
(Nov. 21, 2013, 7:30 AM), https://www.fastcoexist.com/3022028/the-sharing-economy-lacks-a-
shared-definition#8. 
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traditional market behaviors—renting, lending, swapping, sharing, 
bartering, gifting—through technology, taking place in ways and on a 
scale not possible before the [I]nternet.”66  The Collaborative Economy is 
a “system of decentralized networks and marketplaces that unlocks the 
value of underused assets by matching needs and haves, in ways that 
bypass traditional middlemen.”67  While innovative, this concept of 
collaborative consumption is not new to the industrialized world.  
Websites that allow for the redistribution of underused assets like 
Craigslist68 and eBay,69 were introduced to the general public in 1995.70  
Over a decade later, companies offering more “on-demand” services like 
Uber,71 Airbnb,72 and TaskRabbit73 started popping up in the form of 
mobile apps.  The vast growth of this industry implies a definitive 
paradigm shift in the way we access goods and services.74 
Arun Sundararajan, a professor at New York University’s Stern 
School of Business, broke down four of the key factors that have sparked 
growth within the sharing economy.75  First, Sundararajan explained that 
during the last decade, “[t]he consumerization of digital technologies” 
has shifted the focus of “information technologies” from business-driven 
models to individual-centric ones (e.g., creation of social media).76  
                                                          
 66.   Rachel Botsman, Defining the Sharing Economy: What Is Collaborative Consumption—
and What Isn’t?, FAST COMPANY (May 27, 2015, 6:15 AM), 
https://www.fastcoexist.com/3046119/defining-the-sharing-economy-what-is-collaborative-
consumption-and-what-isnt#1. 
 67.   Id. 
 68.   See CRAIGSLIST, https://www.craigslist.org/about/factsheet (last visited Sept. 19, 2016). 
 69.   See Our Company, EBAY, https://www.ebayinc.com/our-company/ (last visited Sept. 19, 
2016). 
 70.   See CRAIGSLIST, http://www.craigslist.org/about/factsheet (last visited Sept. 19, 2016); 
Our History, EBAY, https://www.ebayinc.com/our-company/our-history/ (last visited Sept. 19, 
2016). 
 71.   See UBER, https://www.uber.com/our-story/ (last visited Sept. 19, 2016) (founded in 
2008). 
 72.   See About Us, AIRBNB, https://www.airbnb.com/about/about-us (last visited Sept. 19, 
2016) (founded in 2008). 
 73.   Brian Solomon, TaskRabbit Founder Steps Down As CEO After Eight Years, FORBES 
(Apr. 14, 2016, 3:12 PM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/briansolomon/2016/04/14/taskrabbit-
founder-steps-down-as-ceo-after-eight-years/#c0166f05ae8e  (founded in 2008). 
 74.   Rachel Botsman, The Sharing Economy Lacks a Shared Definition, FAST COMPANY (Nov. 
21, 2013, 7:30 AM), http://www.fastcoexist.com/3022028/the-sharing-economy-lacks-a-shared-
definition#8. 
 75.   See The Power of Connection: Peer-to-Peer Businesses Before the H. Comm. on Small 
Bus., 113th Cong. 1 (2014) (written testimony of Arun Sundararajan, Professor and NEC Faculty 
Fellow, NYU Stern School of Business, and Head of Social Cities Initiative, NYU Center for Urban 
Science and Progress), http://smallbusiness.house.gov/uploadedfiles/1-15-
2014_revised_sundararajan_testimony.pdf [hereinafter Sundararajan Written Testimony]. 
 76.   Id. at 3. 
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Second, Sundararajan credited the “emergence of ‘digital institutions.’”77  
These technology-based platforms make the sharing economy possible 
by “facilitat[ing] economic exchange in the same way that economic 
institutions historically have done.”78  Third, Sundararajan explained that 
“[u]rbanization and globalization” have impacted the popularity of this 
sharing economy.79  Because more people are moving into cities, space is 
becoming more limited.80  Thus, city dwellers are beginning to engage in 
“natural ‘sharing economies’” by bringing people together to share assets 
and space.81  Finally, Sundararajan points out that “[e]cological and 
resource considerations” are becoming increasingly popular.82  By 
engaging in the sharing economy, people can live “asset-light,” and 
consume fewer resources, thereby lowering their carbon footprint.83 
1. The Sharing Economy 
Now officially listed in the Oxford Dictionaries, the sharing 
economy is defined as “[a]n economic system in which assets or services 
are shared between private individuals, either free or for a fee, typically 
by means of the Internet.”84  This relatively new and rapidly expanding 
economy thrives on the theory that “access trumps ownership” in a lot of 
ways.85  As the industrial era becomes a relic of the past, and we move 
further into a “networked society,” people will become increasingly 
dependent on technological platforms that facilitate peer-to-peer 
exchanges.86 
From a technical perspective, the term “sharing economy,” refers to 
a network of technological platforms that facilitates peer-to-peer 
transactions.  This network comprises three essential components: [1] 
entrepreneurs, [2] consumers, and [3] the platform, itself.87  
                                                          
 77.   Id at 4. 
 78.   Id. 
 79.   See id. 
 80.   See id. 
 81.   Id. 
 82.   See id. 
 83.   Id. 
 84.   Sharing Economy, OXFORD DICTIONARIES, 
http://www.oxforddictionaries.com/us/definition/american_english/sharing-economy (last visited 
Sept. 19, 2016). 
 85.   The Rise of the Sharing Economy, ECONOMIST (Mar. 9, 2013), 
http://www.economist.com/news/leaders/21573104-internet-everything-hire-rise-sharing-economy. 
 86.   Arun Sundararajan, Opinion, A Safety Net Fit for the Sharing Economy, FIN. TIMES (June 
23, 2015), https://www.ft.com/content/b1d854de-169f-11e5-b07f-00144feabdc0. 
 87.   Sundararajan Written Testimony, supra note 75, at 2. 
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Entrepreneurs supply goods and services to the platforms, or 
marketplaces.88  Consumers are those who purchase these goods or 
services from the entrepreneurs.89  The platform is a “person-to-person 
marketplace[] which facilitate[s] the exchange of goods and services 
between [entrepreneurs and consumers].”90  Typically, these platforms 
are also responsible for collecting and distributing payments, often 
charging a commission on the exchange.91 
a. The Peer-to-Peer Business Model: A Case Study of Uber 
Uber is a San Francisco tech company that was founded in 2008.92  
The company’s peer-to-peer business model utilizes a technological 
platform to engage consumers and entrepreneurs in ridesharing.93  
Offering services that closely resemble taxi or other car services, the 
company asserts that they increase the accessibility of cities by 
connecting riders to drivers through their apps.94 
At the end of 2014, Uber’s driver base exceeded 160,000.95  More 
astonishingly, the number of registered Uber drivers has “doubled every 
six months for the last two years.”96  While approximately 38% of Uber 
drivers do not hold any other form of employment, the majority of Uber 
drivers also engage in either full-time or part-time employment outside 
of Uber.97 
i. From an Entrepreneur’s Perspective 
For the entrepreneur (i.e. driver), Uber imposes three requirements: 
[1] all drivers must be twenty-one years old with a personal driver’s 
license; [2] each driver’s car must be a 2001 model year or newer (some 
cities require a 2006 model year or newer); and [3] all drivers must pass 
                                                          
 88.   Id. 
 89.   See id. 
 90.   Id. 
 91.   Id. 
 92.   UBER, https://www.uber.com/our-story/ (last visited Sept. 19, 2016). 
 93.   See id. 
 94.   See id. 
 95.   Brian Solomon, The Numbers Behind Uber’s Exploding Driver Force, FORBES (May 1, 
2015, 12:27 PM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/briansolomon/2015/05/01/the-numbers-behind-ubers-
exploding-driver-force/. 
 96.   Id. 
 97.   See id. 
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a background check.98  Once approved, Uber drivers can use the Uber 
mobile application (“app”) to accept rides from local Uber subscribers.99  
Uber allows drivers to choose their own schedules and reports that 
drivers earn an average of $19.04 per hour.100  Uber also provides its 
drivers with various amounts of insurance (depending on whether they 
are “available” to pick up rides, “en route” to pick up a rider, or on their 
trips).101 
ii. From a Consumer’s Perspective 
For the consumer, the company’s services are available exclusively 
through an online app that subscribers can access with a computer or a 
mobile device.102  Once the app is downloaded, Uber requires the user to 
input their personal information and payment information.103  After the 
registration process is complete, the user may request a ride,104 and that 
order is offered to available Uber drivers in the area.105  Once a ride has 
been requested by an Uber subscriber and accepted by an Uber driver, 
the subscriber can track the location of the car on her mobile device.106  
Uber subscribers pay for their rides via Uber’s app.107 
iii. The Model 
Uber is wholly responsible for setting ride fares, and these rates 
fluctuate during “peak demand times.”108  Uber charges approximately 
20% commissions on each ride (although this number is lower in some 
cities).109  Uber uses the revenue from these commissions to cover 
                                                          
 98.   See Driving Jobs vs. Driving with Uber, UBER, https://www.uber.com/driver-jobs (last 
visited Sept. 23, 2016). 
 99.   See id. (stating the driver may use the “Uber app to find riders” in their area). 
 100.   Id. 
 101.   Id. 
 102.   See Sign Up to Ride, UBER, http://www.uber.com/ride (last visited Sept. 23, 2016). 
 103.   Id. 
 104.   See Ride, UBER, https://www.uber.com/ride (last visited Sept. 23, 2016). 
 105.   See Putting Drivers First: Accepting Trip Requests, UBER, 
https://www.uber.com/drive/partner-app/ (last visited Sept. 23, 2016). 
 106.   Ride, UBER, https://www.uber.com/ride (last visited Sept. 29, 2016).  See also Aswath 
Damodaran, A Disruptive Cab Ride to Riches: The Uber Payoff, FORBES (June 10, 2014, 2:37 PM), 
http://www.forbes.com/sites/aswathdamodaran/2014/06/10/a-disruptive-cab-ride-to-riches-the-uber-
payoff/. 
 107.   See Damodaran, supra note 106. 
 108.   Id. 
 109.   Id. 
2016 NOT LIKE THE OTHERS 157 
overhead and expenses for “R&D, technology development, customer 
acquisition costs (including rebates to new customers), marketing[,] and 
the employees/infrastructure it needs in each of the cities that it operates 
in.”110  Uber does not own any cars, and it does not classify any of its 
drivers as employees.111  Because Uber operates a low-cost business 
model, the company likely “keep[s] a large percent[age] of its revenues 
as profits.”112 
b. Classification of Peer-to-Peer Sharing Economy Workers Under the 
FLSA 
As previously mentioned, workers who engage in the sharing 
economy often find themselves stuck in the borderland between 
employees and independent contractors.  Like other sharing entities, 
Uber is currently facing a class action lawsuit that alleges the company 
has been misclassifying its drivers as independent contractors.113  To 
understand whether Uber drivers, and more specifically drivers for 
UberX and UberPOOL (Uber’s more traditional rideshare programs), 
meet the FLSA definition of employee, this section will analyze how the 
economic realities test applies to Uber’s business practices. 
i. “Is the Work an Integral Part of the Employer’s Business?”114 
The Wage and Hour Division’s Administrator’s Interpretation 
explains that, “[i]f the work performed by a worker is integral to the 
employer’s business, it is more likely that the worker is economically 
dependent on the employer.”115  The Interpretation goes on to explain 
that an independent contractor’s work is “unlikely to be integral to the 
employer’s business.”116 
Under this factor, UberX and UberPOOL drivers would likely be 
considered employees.  Uber, as a for-profit business, makes money by 
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taking a commission from every Uber ride.  Thus, a court would likely 
determine that Uber drivers are integral to Uber’s business because the 
company is in the business of providing rides, and the drivers are an 
integral part of that operation. 
ii. “Does the Worker’s Managerial Skill Affect the Worker Opportunity 
for Profit or Loss?”117 
This factor examines the worker’s ability to earn a profit and 
experience a loss based on her own managerial skills.118  This factor 
primarily concerns whether the worker had the ability to use her 
judgment and managerial skills to make decisions that would affect her 
financial opportunities.119  This factor requires an important 
consideration that working more hours to increase one’s income is not a 
showing of managerial skill under this factor of the economic realities 
test.120 
Applying this factor to UberX and UberPOOL drivers, it does not 
appear that the drivers would qualify as employees under this factor.  
While picking up more Uber rides and driving longer hours would 
certainly increase an Uber driver’s income, the driver may also control 
her profitability by choosing better driving routes or making herself more 
available in areas that attract more advantageous rides.  On the other 
hand, Uber drivers could argue that because Uber controls the rate the 
drivers can charge, the company exercises more managerial skill. 
iii. “How Does the Worker’s Relative Investment Compare to the 
Employer’s Investment?”121 
For a worker to be classified as an independent contractor under 
factor three, that worker must have some investment, and thus some risk 
of loss.122  The worker’s investment is to be compared to the investment 
of the employer.123  “If the worker’s investment is relatively minor, that 
suggests that the worker and the employer are not on similar footings and 
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that the worker may be economically dependent on the employer.”124 
UberX or UberPOOL drivers would likely be classified as 
independent contractors under this factor.  These drivers are required to 
supply their own car, pay for their own gas, and pay for the necessary 
services on their vehicles.  These investments are not relatively minor 
when compared to the investments made by Uber. 
However, two cases arising out of the Tenth125 and Seventh Circuit126 
Courts of Appeals may indicate that Uber drivers providing their own 
cars and paying for their own maintenance are not investments at all.  
These courts explain, “investing in tools and equipment is not necessarily 
a business investment or a capital expenditure that indicates that the 
worker is an independent contractor.”127  Thus, if an Uber driver’s 
personal car is not considered a business investment or a capital 
expenditure, it is possible that a court would deem an Uber driver an 
employee instead of an independent contractor. 
iv. “Does the Work Performed Require Special Skill and Initiative?”128 
Occasionally a worker who demonstrates a high level of skill, 
judgment, and initiative will be considered economically independent.129  
It is important to note, however, that skills, alone, are not determinative 
of employment status.130 
Applying this factor would likely result in the classification of Uber 
drivers as employees because driving a car would not likely be 
considered a specialized skill.131  An argument could be made that Uber 
drivers “exercis[e] business skills, judgment, or initiative” 132 when they 
choose which rides to accept and when they determine which routes to 
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drive.  Unfortunately, this is probably not specialized enough to meet the 
high standard of an independent contractor under this factor. 
v. “Is the Relationship Between the Worker and the Employer 
Permanent or Indefinite?”133 
Under the Wage and Hour Division’s guidance, an employee is a 
worker who has a permanent or indefinite relationship with an 
employer.134  This relationship demonstrates a level of economic 
dependence that is only present with employees.135  However, this is not 
to say that the absence of a permanent relationship automatically forms 
an independent contractor employment relationship.136  Moreover, it is 
important to consider whether the absence of permanence is caused by 
the “operational characteristics intrinsic to the industry” or “the 
worker[‘s] own business initiative.”137  However, in Superior Care, the 
Second Circuit explained, “neither working for other employers nor not 
relying on the employer as his or her primary source of income transform 
the worker into the employer’s independent contractor.”138  Furthermore, 
it is important to consider whether UberX and UberPOOL drivers control 
their own schedules entirely.  Because of this, these drivers do not likely 
share a permanent or indefinite relationship with Uber.  However, as 
noted by the Second Circuit, this absence of permanence does not 
automatically create an independent contractor relationship.139  Rather, 
when applying the standard from the Second Circuit, it appears that an 
Uber driver’s impermanent relationship with Uber is simply due to the 
driver’s business incentives.  Thus, under this factor, an Uber driver 
would likely be classified as an employee. 
vi. “What is the Nature and Degree of the Employer’s Control?”140 
To be considered an independent contractor under this factor, the 
worker must exert control over important aspects of the work so that the 
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worker appears to be conducting his own business.141  When considering 
this factor, the Third Circuit expressed, “the fact that the workers could 
control the hours during which they worked and that they were subject to 
little direct supervision was unsurprising given that such facts are typical 
of homeworkers and thus largely insignificant in determining their 
status.”142  Furthermore, a worker’s ability to control his schedule is not 
enough to establish an independent contractor relationship.143 
Using this guidance, it appears that an UberX or an UberPOOL 
driver would be considered an employee when applying this factor.  
Outside of controlling their hours and their appearance, Uber drivers 
cannot alter the Uber framework of service.  Uber controls a large 
portion of the driver’s business.  From setting the payment rates to 
controlling the customer reviews, Uber holds control over the driver. 
III. ANALYSIS 
While there is certainly a need for regulation in this rapidly 
expanding economy, such regulations must be carefully crafted to ensure 
necessary consumer and worker protection while also protecting 
innovative entrepreneurialism.  This section will discuss the policy 
implications of applying traditional employment classification to the 
peer-to-peer business model.  This section also proposes two alternative 
legislative solutions.  Both solutions aim to prevent the negative 
implications of maintaining a traditional employment model and to 
provide clarity in employment classification within the peer-to-peer 
sharing economy. 
A. Policy Implications of Classifying Sharing Economy Workers as 
Employees 
1. Disadvantages 
Applying traditional labor and employment laws to the sharing 
economy will be detrimental to this innovative peer-to-peer business 
model and will likely lead to the material alteration of the industry.  Such 
an application would harm both the sharing economy and low-income, 
urban communities that have the most to gain from access to asset-
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sharing programs. 
a. Impact on the Sharing Economy as a Business Model 
The companies that create peer-to-peer transaction platforms likely 
lack the infrastructure necessary to support a large number of employees.  
These companies that engage in the sharing economy are also not likely 
structured to support the minimum wage and overtime pay regulations 
that are imposed by employer-employee relationships under the FLSA.  
Forcing these companies to either reduce their control or bear the cost of 
“employing” every micro-entrepreneur who utilizes their platform will 
lead to industry-altering results. 
Within the peer-to-peer business model, the platform creator is 
primarily responsible for facilitating a space in which people can begin 
transacting and collaborating.  If allowed to flourish, the peer-to-peer 
sharing economy has the ability to foster entrepreneurialism and 
innovation.144  Moreover, “the relatively low-risk micro-entrepreneurship 
allowed by peer-to-peer business may be the first step to broader 
entrepreneurship, perhaps an ‘on ramp’ . . . to freelancing or starting an 
independent business.”145  In addition to this potential for growth, the 
peer-to-peer sharing economy may also create “productivity gains” in the 
consumption of untapped or underutilized assets and “underutilized 
human capital.”146  Creating a market that is focused on the efficient use 
of assets and labor fundamentally increases the productivity.147 
The standards, or controls, imposed by these platforms exist to 
ensure consistency, efficiency, and consumer protection.  For example, 
Uber requires all of its drivers to undergo background checks before they 
can begin accepting ride requests.148  Similarly, Uber controls the fare 
rates for all of its subscribers.149  In setting these prices, Uber allows 
subscribers to check their “fare estimate[s]” before their trips begin.150 
If companies like Uber were no longer able to impose these types of 
controls over their platforms without conferring all of the regulations 
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imposed on employer-employee relationships, the peer-to-peer business 
model would likely experience a shift towards lower safety standards, 
loss of uniformity in price, and loss of uniformity in service.  
Additionally, “[r]egulatory uncertainties and concerns about liability can 
impede individuals from pursuing otherwise productive and profitable 
peer-to-peer business opportunities.”151  Thus, while large, well-
established peer-to-peer businesses—like Uber—may find a way to adapt 
and comply with these regulations, the application of these FLSA 
requirements will stifle innovation in smaller peer-to-peer businesses and 
startups. 
b. Impact on Low-Income Communities 
The peer-to-peer sharing economy rests in an unparalleled position to 
provide efficient access to goods and services in low-income 
communities.  Historically, access to goods or services required 
ownership and infrastructure.152  However, the rise of the peer-to-peer 
sharing economy has both created the necessary infrastructure and 
eliminated the requirement of ownership.153 
Statistically, low-income, urban communities stand to benefit the 
most from the growing access to peer-to-peer businesses.154  Peer-to-peer 
sharing economies provide access to resources that might not otherwise 
be available in lower-income, urban environments.155  In fact, research 
has shown that “ride-sharing has a ‘disproportionately positive effect on 
lower-income consumers.’”156  For instance, lower-income consumers 
are less likely to possess the spending power required for ownership, and 
thus, these communities are more likely to benefit from greater 
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accessibility to the sharing economy.157  In fact, data collected from 
Getaround, a peer-to-peer car sharing and rental service, showed that 
people living in lower-income communities in San Francisco were more 
likely to use Getaround services than people living in higher-income 
areas.158  Furthermore, these “[l]ower-income consumers also stand to 
gain the most from renting out their goods [and services] on these 
platforms.”159  In this context, the researchers reasoned that providing a 
$10.00 Uber ride is more beneficial to a service worker than it would be 
to a banker.160  It seems apparent that the destruction or material 
alteration of the peer-to-peer industry will likely harm low-income and 
urban communities that rely on asset-sharing and collaborative 
consumption. 
2. Advantages 
Despite an employer’s intentions, the misclassification of employees 
as independent contractors results in widespread consequences.  Workers 
classified as independent contractors do not enjoy the same economic 
and social benefits that are protected by the employer-employee 
relationship.161  Because independent contractors are not protected by the 
FLSA, employers are not bound by the wage and hour requirements 
afforded to employees under the Act.  In addition, companies that 
classify their workers as independent contractors save between 20% and 
40% of labor costs.162  These savings coupled with the absence of 
protection and oversight may incentivize the misclassification of 
employees as independent contractors.163 
a. Strict Compliance with FLSA Employment Classifications Precludes 
Potential for Abusive Misclassification 
The Wage and Hour Division’s Interpretation expressed that 
“[m]isclassification of employees as independent contractors is found in 
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an increasing number of workplaces.”164  Employees wrongly classified 
as independent contractors are deprived of necessary workplace 
protections like “minimum wage, overtime compensation, 
unemployment insurance, and workers’ compensation.”165  Additionally, 
misclassification negatively impacts the federal government by lowering 
tax revenues, and it harms competition within the market by creating an 
inherent disadvantage for businesses that use proper classifications.166 
The disadvantages faced by competing businesses are compounded 
when considering the peer-to-peer sharing economy.  Modern business 
models, like the one used by Uber, are profoundly advantageous when 
compared to a more traditional model.  Because the competitive 
advantages and cost savings of the peer-to-peer business model are so 
great, there is a higher risk of abusive misclassification.  By requiring 
strict compliance with the current FLSA employment classification 
structure, companies like Uber would almost certainly have to classify 
their workers as employees.  Forcing this transition would largely 
eliminate the business advantages of the peer-to-peer business model, 
and thereby curb the incentive to misclassify employees as independent 
contractors. 
B. Legislative Recommendations 
Because employment relationships created by the peer-to-peer 
sharing economy do not fall neatly into either the employee or the 
independent contractor classification, courts are forced to apply ill-
suited, traditional classifications to a rapidly evolving workforce.  This 
article proposes two legislative options to address these concerns: [1] the 
adoption of a third, “dependent contractor” classification under the 
FLSA; or alternatively, [2] the inclusion of a peer-to-peer market 
exemption from overtime payment requirements under the FLSA. 
Both solutions address one of the fundamental concerns with 
classifying peer-to-peer workers as employees—FLSA overtime pay 
requirements.  Promotion of entrepreneurialism is one of the key values 
in the peer-to-peer sharing economy, and fundamental to the promotion 
of peer-to-peer entrepreneurialism is the freedom to make choices.  If 
peer-to-peer businesses are bound by FLSA’s overtime pay 
requirements, they may be forced to limit the choices workers can make 
                                                          
 164.   Administrator’s Interpretation, supra note 27, at 1. 
 165.   Id. 
 166.   Id. 
166 KANSAS LAW REVIEW Vol. 65 
regarding their schedule (i.e. the amount of hours worked in one week). 
1. Congress Should Include “Dependent Contractors” as a Third 
Employment Classification Under the FLSA 
Congress should create a “dependent contractor” classification under 
the FLSA to encompass the modern employment relationships formed 
within the peer-to-peer sharing economy.  The inclusion of a third 
employment classification would allow for the efficient and effective 
regulation of peer-to-peer businesses while leaving enough flexibility to 
foster innovation and growth. 
The United States would not be the first industrialized nation to 
incorporate such a standard into its labor and employment laws.167  While 
international dependent contractor classifications are more frequently 
discussed in relation to collective bargaining,168 the impact of this 
additional classification under the FLSA would be profoundly beneficial.  
By adopting an intermediate employment classification, namely the 
dependent contractor classification, the Department of Labor would 
improve American labor and employment law in two ways.  First, this 
standard would create a balance between the Department of Labor’s 
interest in employee protection and the peer-to-peer sharing economy’s 
interest in innovation.  Second, this standard would establish a modern 
classification that encompasses the types of employment relationships 
formed within the peer-to-peer sharing economy. 
a. The Dependent Contractor: An International Approach 
H.W. Arthurs first introduced the notion of dependent contractors to 
North America in 1965.169  Borrowing the term from a Swedish writer, 
Arthurs opined that a new category of employment—dependent 
contractors—be included in Canada’s labor laws on collective 
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bargaining.170  By 1980, the majority of Canadian provinces adopted 
dependent contractor classification for determining collective bargaining 
rights.171 
Under the Ontario Labour Relations Act, a dependent contractor is 
defined as: 
[A] person, whether or not employed under a contract of employment, 
and whether or not furnishing tools, vehicles, equipment, machinery, 
material, or any other thing owned by the dependent contractor, who 
performs work or services for another person for compensation or 
reward on such terms and conditions that the dependent contractor is in 
a position of economic dependence upon, and under an obligation to 
perform duties for, that person more closely resembling the relationship 
of an employee than that of an independent contractor . . .172 
Defining “economic dependence,” however, creates more of a challenge.  
While some Canadian jurisdictions establish a multi-factor test,173 others 
simply require a showing that the worker “derive[s] at least 80% of his 
income from the employer.”174  Similar intermediate employment 
classifications exist in Germany and Italy.175  To be considered a 
dependent contractor in Germany, workers must only prove that “more 
than 50% of [their] income [was] paid by one person or institution.”176  
German artists and writers, on the other hand, are only required to prove 
that 33% of their income was paid by one person or institution.177 
b. Proposed Definition and Application of the Dependent Contractor 
Classification Under the FLSA 
To broaden employment classifications and incorporate a clear 
dependent contractor status under the FLSA, both Congress and the 
Department of Labor must act.  First, Congress must codify a definitional 
standard for this employment classification under the FLSA.  Congress 
must also establish the rights to be conferred on dependent contractors 
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under the FLSA.  Following the codification of this standard, the 
Department of Labor Wage and Hour Division should amend the 
economic realities test to include a seventh factor addressing the level of 
economic dependence required to qualify as a dependent contractor. 
i. Proposed Definition and Rights of a Dependent Contractor Under the 
FLSA 
To establish a clear, unambiguous standard for dependent 
contractors, Congress must codify a definition of the term under the 
FLSA.  This article proposes the inclusion of a dependent contractor 
classification that would closely resemble the Canadian and German 
models.  Under the FLSA a dependent contractor would be defined as: 
A person, regardless of contract, who performs work or provides 
services for compensation on such terms and conditions that the 
dependent contractor is in a position of economic dependence upon, 
and under an obligation to perform duties for, the other more closely 
resembling the relationship of an employee than that of an independent 
contractor.178 
This definition, derived from the Canadian model, focuses on the 
“economic dependence” of the dependent contractor.  In focusing on this 
economic dependence, this definition captures the current peer-to-peer 
sharing economy workers that exist in the borderland between employee 
and independent contractor. 
ii. Proposed Incorporation of an “Economic Dependence” Factor into 
the Economic Realities Test 
To include a dependent contractor classification under the FLSA, the 
Department of Labor should incorporate a specific economic dependence 
factor into the existing economic realities test.  This factor should only 
be considered when the economic realities test does not produce a clear, 
definitive result.  To preserve the necessary portions of the status quo, 
preference will be given to the employee and independent contractor 
classifications.  Thus, workers may only be classified as a dependent 
contractor if classification as an employee or independent contractor is 
impracticable given the nature of the employment relationship. 
In practice, the dependent contractor classification would exist in the 
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space between an employee and an independent contractor.  To 
determine whether a worker qualifies as a dependent contractor, this 
article proposes using a standard similar to the one used in Germany.  
Courts should consider whether one employer in the employment 
relationship paid 50% of the worker’s income.  If one employer has paid 
50% of the worker’s total income, this worker would be entitled to 
receive FLSA protections as a dependent contractor.  By establishing this 
threshold, the FLSA can account for workers who casually engage in a 
peer-to-peer business to supplement existing income, and those that are 
economically dependent on the peer-to-peer transaction. 
iii. Proposed Benefits to be Conferred Upon Dependent Contractors 
Under the FLSA, workers who are classified as dependent 
contractors would be entitled to protections greater than those of an 
independent contractor, but less than those of an employee.  This article 
proposes that dependent contractors should be afforded minimum wage 
protections, but exempted from overtime pay requirements.  In practice, 
this is similar to the FLSA exemptions offered to workers like 
commissioned retail employees, domestic service workers, and taxi 
drivers.179 
c. Possible Impacts of Including a Dependent Contractor Classification 
Under the FLSA 
Incorporating a dependent contractor classification under the FLSA 
will likely result in two key benefits to the greater peer-to-peer sharing 
economy.  First, the adoption of this third classification will promote 
entrepreneurialism by balancing the FLSA’s interest in employee 
protections and the peer-to-peer sharing economy’s interest in 
innovation.  Second, the adoption of this dependent contractor 
classification will create a modern, ascertainable standard for 
employment classifications. 
i. Including Dependent Contractors Under the FLSA Would Balance 
Employee Protection and Employer Innovation 
As previously stated, the FLSA was created to protect our society 
“from the evils and dangers resulting from wages too low to buy the bare 
                                                          
 179.   U.S. DEP’T OF LABOR, WAGE & HOUR DIV., supra note 25, at 6. 
170 KANSAS LAW REVIEW Vol. 65 
necessities of life and from long hours of work injurious to health.”180  
Any alterations or amendments to the Act should be made in light of this 
goal.  In keeping with this mission, the addition of a dependent 
contractor classification under the FLSA would balance the FLSA’s 
interest in maintaining employee protections with the peer-to-peer 
sharing economy’s interest in unencumbered business practices. 
By providing this third classification—one that will likely 
encompass many of the peer-to-peer workforce—the FLSA will no 
longer risk destroying entrepreneurial spirit of the sharing economy.  
Furthermore, eliminating the overtime pay requirements for dependent 
contractors allows for peer-to-peer businesses to continue operating 
much like they do today.  Companies like Uber, whose workers earn an 
average of $19.00 per hour (well over the minimum wage requirements), 
can continue to host a peer-to-peer market place where micro-
entrepreneurs control the amount and frequency of their work.181 
ii. Including Dependent Contractors Under the FLSA Would Create a 
Reliable Standard for Employment Classifications 
By establishing a dependent contractor classification to encompass 
workers who engage in the peer-to-peer sharing economy, the FLSA will 
create a reliable standard for employment classifications.  Creating a 
clear, reliable standard is preferential for three reasons: [1] a clear 
standard will reduce the number of misclassified employees; [2] a clear 
standard will reduce the amount of litigation arising from improperly 
classified employees; and [3] a clear standard for classifying employees 
under the FLSA will allow companies to utilize new and innovative ways 
to add jobs to the market. 
Creating a third classification—like the dependent contractor—
would likely reduce the number of misclassified employees in the peer-
to-peer sharing economy.  Because there is no legal precedent regarding 
the classification of this workforce, and because existing FLSA 
classifications do not adequately represent the sharing economy 
workforce, companies are left to guess at which classification best 
matches their workforce.  This guessing game is detrimental to both 
workers and employers alike because it leaves workers without a clear 
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understanding of their rights, and it leaves employers vulnerable to 
litigation. 
Similarly, a clear, easily ascertainable standard would likely reduce 
the amount of litigation arising out of the misclassification of workers.  It 
is not surprising that uncertainty begets litigation.  This has proven true 
with the recent influx of litigation concerning the classification of peer-
to-peer sharing economy workers.182  Class action suits brought against 
companies engaged in the sharing economy have become increasingly 
common in light of these uncertainties.183  Peer-to-peer sharing 
companies, like Uber, have been hit with the brunt of this litigation.184  
By establishing a dependent contractor classification, the FLSA would 
improve employers’ ability to properly classify their workforce.  In 
establishing this new employment classification, the need for such 
litigation would likely plummet.  Furthermore, by ensuring that proper 
classifications exist for all members of the workforce, the FLSA could 
eliminate the “square peg, round hole” dilemma faced by members of the 
peer-to-peer sharing economy.  With a proper statutory classification 
scheme in place, peer-to-peer businesses would continue to have the 
flexibility to create new and innovative employment relationships 
without fear of costly lawsuits. 
2. Congress Should Establish a Peer-to-Peer Market Exception Under 
the FLSA 
As an alternative to the creation of a dependent contractor 
classification, the FLSA could establish a new exemption—the peer-to-
peer market exemption.  The FLSA currently exempts some categories of 
workers from federal minimum wage, overtime pay requirements, or 
both.185  Generally, these exemptions are construed narrowly against the 
employer.186  Some of the most commonly FLSA exemptions include: 
[1] commissioned sales employees exemption from overtime pay; [2] 
computer professional’s exemption from overtime pay; [3] motor carrier 
personnel’s exemption from overtime pay; and [4] farmworkers who, in 
some cases, can be exempt from minimum wage and overtime 
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provisions.187  This section proposes the addition of a peer-to-peer 
market exemption from overtime pay and analyzes the potential impacts 
of this new exemption. 
a. The Proposed Peer-to-Peer Market Exemption 
A peer-to-peer market exemption would exclude all workers in the 
peer-to-peer sharing economy from access to the FLSA’s overtime pay 
requirements.  This peer-to-peer market exemption would closely 
resemble the six other overtime-only exemptions, which include: [1] 
certain commissioned retail or service employees; [2] railroad workers, 
taxi drivers, and various other transportation workers; [3] announcers, 
news editors, and some broadcasting station engineers; [4] “domestic 
service workers” who live with their employers; [5] movie theater 
workers; and [6] some farmworkers.188 
Similar in its effort to limit employer’s exposure to the FLSA 
overtime pay requirements, the peer-to-peer market exemption would 
apply to all workers who use technological platforms to engage in peer-
to-peer transactions.  This exemption would not apply to workers who 
clearly meet the FLSA definition of employ and thereby form employer-
employee relationships under the Act.  Employers, for the purposes of 
this exemption, would be those who create and maintain the 
technological platforms. 
To qualify for this exemption, a peer-to-peer business must show that 
its workforce uses a technological platform to engage in peer-to-peer 
transactions.  Uber drivers, for example, would fall under this peer-to-
peer exemption.  Because Uber drivers utilize Uber’s technological 
platform to engage in peer-to-peer transactions (i.e. ridesharing), these 
workers would be exempted from qualifying for overtime pay under the 
FLSA.  It is also important to note that any material change in an existing 
employment relationship would require a re-evaluation of the peer-to-
peer market exemption to ensure proper compliance. 
b. Possible Impacts of Including a Peer-to-Peer Market Exemption 
Under the FLSA 
Including a peer-to-peer market exemption under the FLSA will 
likely result in three primary benefits to the greater peer-to-peer sharing 
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economy.  First, the adoption of this exemption will likely force peer-to-
peer businesses to shoulder more responsibility for self-regulating.  
Second, the adoption of this exemption will likely allow 
entrepreneurialism to flourish. Finally, the creation of a peer-to-peer 
market exemption will create a clear, ascertainable standard for 
employment classifications, thereby minimizing employers’ vulnerability 
to lawsuits and maximizing workers’ access to workplace protections. 
i. Adoption of the Peer-to-Peer Market Exemption Would Give the 
Peer-to-Peer Sharing Economy More Power to Self-Regulate 
While granting the peer-to-peer businesses more power to self-
regulate seems like a recipe for abuse, these platforms are in the best 
position to ensure fairness and consumer safety. In his written testimony 
for the Congressional hearing titled, The Power of Connection: Peer-to-
Peer Businesses, Professor Sundararajan outlined three reasons why 
peer-to-peer businesses should be granted more regulating power over 
the peer-to-peer sharing economy.189 
First, Sundararajan explained, “[t]he interests of the platforms are 
well aligned with facilitating safe and profitable peer-to-peer trade.”190  
Because the success of peer-to-peer businesses is intricately bound to the 
“volume and continued growth of [the] trade,” these businesses are in the 
best position to regulate “infringing entrepreneurs and consumers.”191  
Second, these platforms utilize in-depth “digital identity verification, 
reputation and credit scoring systems.”192  Because these systems connect 
the platform with user’s social media accounts, the platform can leverage 
“social capital” as a means of regulating the platform.193 Additionally, 
these platforms commonly use dual rating systems.194  In an economy 
where reputation determines profitability, these rating systems help 
consumers make informed decisions about which entrepreneurs to 
engage.195  Finally, Sundararajan noted that it is important to consider 
that “[n]ew forms of technology-mediated peer-to-peer business[es] are 
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likely to continue to emerge rapidly over the coming years.”196  By 
granting some regulating power to the peer-to-peer sharing economy, the 
government can shift the burden of “constantly monitoring and 
correcting regulatory misalignment across a wide variety of 
industries.”197 
A peer-to-peer market exemption under the FLSA would give 
platforms the ability to impose self-regulations while still preserving the 
Department of Labor Wage and Hour Division’s power to enforce 
minimum wage standards, create boundaries, and oversee the 
regulations.  This type of collaborative relationship would likely support 
a culture of innovation and growth within both the sharing economy and 
the greater economy as a whole. 
ii. Adoption of the Peer-to-Peer Market Exemption Would Support 
Entrepreneurialism within the Peer-to-Peer Sharing Economy 
Establishing a clear exemption of workers who engage in the peer-
to-peer sharing economy under the FLSA will reduce the pressure on 
peer-to-peer businesses to comply with certain wage and hour laws—
namely, overtime pay requirements.  By reducing this burden, the FLSA 
will create a more nurturing environment within which 
entrepreneurialism can flourish without endangering the rights and 
protections of workers.  Creating a clear, reliable peer-to-peer market 
exemption would promote entrepreneurialism and benefit the economy in 
two important ways. 
First, this peer-to-peer market exemption will benefit small tech 
startups with “national ideas” by protecting them from the burden of 
forming traditional employer-employee relationships with every micro-
entrepreneur that engages with their platform.  For most small tech 
companies, the idea of “employing” possibly hundreds of micro-
entrepreneurs is too high of a risk. Thus, small tech companies with 
creative ideas for the national market will be able to utilize the peer-to-
peer business model because they can rely on this peer-to-peer market 
exemption. Without this exemption, the economic burdens of the FLSA’s 
minimum wage and overtime pay requirements, coupled with an 
impending fear of litigation, would be crippling. 
Second, this peer-to-peer market exemption will foster 
entrepreneurialism on the part of the micro-entrepreneur. Because many 
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peer-to-peer businesses would not likely be able to shoulder the FLSA 
overtime pay requirements, micro-entrepreneurs may lose out on an 
opportunity to innovatively create profit. Furthermore, it is important to 
reiterate that the majority of micro-entrepreneurs who access these 
technological platforms are simply seeking the opportunity to 
supplement the income they receive from other full or part-time 
employment.198  By adopting a peer-to-peer market exemption, the FLSA 
will de-burden peer-to-peer businesses and promote the entrepreneurial 
spirit of the peer-to-peer sharing economy. 
iii. Adoption of the Peer-to-Peer Market Exemption Would Provide a 
Clear, Ascertainable Standard for the Classification of Employees 
Similar to the potential advantages discussed in Part III.B.1, creating 
a clear peer-to-peer market exemption would likely reduce the number of 
misclassified employees in the peer-to-peer sharing economy.  By 
offering an exemption for these workers, the FLSA will create a 
disincentive for the misclassification of workers in the peer-to-peer 
sharing economy. This exemption would also provide peer-to-peer 
businesses with a reasonable and economical regulation for their 
workforce. 
Reduction of misclassification would almost certainly correlate with 
a reduction in the amount of litigation concerning these employment 
relationships. This potential impact is essential to the promotion of 
innovation and growth within the peer-to-peer sharing economy. Because 
of the growing costs, innovation will always be stifled in the face of 
impending litigation. Thus, the creation of a peer-to-peer market 
exemption is essential to fostering entrepreneurialism in the peer-to-peer 
sharing economy. 
IV. CONCLUSION 
While misclassification of employees has been a problem for many 
years, the rapid expansion of the sharing economy has drawn some 
much-needed attention to the outdated system the FLSA uses to classify 
employment relationships. It is increasingly clear that the FLSA’s strict 
binary for classifying employment relationships no longer suits the 
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constantly evolving workforce.  Thus, it is imperative that Congress 
enacts meaningful change to create clear and comprehensive 
employment classifications.  Whether adopting a third employment 
classification or exempting peer-to-peer businesses from the FLSA 
overtime pay requirements, action must be taken to bring American labor 
and employment law into the 21st Century. 
 
